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Abstract
This Note presents the factual setting in which the instant claim arose, and discusses the
rulings of the lower courts and the conflicting rationales in light of existing law. In conclusion, it
proposes a balancing test incorporating the relevant criteria for consideration in this and like cases.
NOTES
THE SEPARATE ENTITY FICTION EXPOSED:
DISREGARDING SELF-SERVING RECITALS OF JURIDICAL
AUTONOMY IN NATIONALIZATION CASES
INTRODUCTION
The Cuban revolution of the late 1950's, which was responsi-
ble for the forced expropriation of the banking industry in Cuba,'
effectuated a permanent change in the economic and social order of
that country.2 Of the voluminous litigation which ensued from
these expropriations, 3 this Note is primarily concerned with Banco
1. The Act of July 6, 1960, No. 851, 58 Gaceta Oficial [G.O.] 16,367, 16,367-68
(Cuba), reprinted in Joint App. at 57-61, First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comereio
Exterior de Cuba, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 253 (1982), and the Resolution of Sept. 17, 1960,
No. 2, 58 Gaceta Oficial Extraordinaria [G.O.E.] at 1-2, Joint App. at 70-75, Bancec, were
the means by which the Cuban branches of First National City Bank, First National Bank of
Boston, and Chase Manhattan Bank were nationalized. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 878 (2d Cir. 1981). Cuba is the only expropriating
country in the Americas which has not recognized its liability to pay for property so taken.
See A. LOWENFELD, EXPROPRIATION IN THE AMERICAS 5 (1971). For a discussion of the Cuban
expropriations, see infra notes 8-22 and accompanying text.
2. For a general discussion of the Cuban revolution and the installation of the new
national government, see E. BAKLANOFF, EXPROPRIATION OF U.S. INVESTMENTS IN CUBA,
MExico, AND CHILE (1975); M. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF
FOREICN PRIVATE PROPERTY (1976); A. LOWENFELD, supra note 1. That these changes were
drastic is not questioned.
The new regime viewed itself as the lawful successor to its predecessor, the Batista
government, and effected substantial changes in Cuba primarily by building on
preexisting laws and institutions. A number of statutes were enacted, and decrees
announced, in pursuit of two general goals: to concentrate the means of production
in the hands of the Cuban government and to restrict greatly the role of foreign
enterprises in the Cuban economy.
Chase, 658 F.2d at 878.
3. See, e.g., Chase, 658 F.2d 875; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank N.Y.
Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981); Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F.
Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified sub nom. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d
Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd,
431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded, 400 U.S. 1019, rev'd on remand, 442
F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd and remanded, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), affd on remand, 478
F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973); F. Palicio y Compania v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
aff'd per curiam, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Brush v. Republic of Cuba,
389 U.S. 830 (1967); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), afJ'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), on remand sub nom.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (withholding determination to dismiss
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Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First National City Bank4
(Bancec), which remains to be resolved with finality.
The disposition of this case, which is presently before the
Supreme Court, will have potential impact on the future expro-
priatory conduct of nations.5 The issue confronting the Court is
whether the defendant, First National City Bank (Citibank), may
assert against the plaintiff, Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de
Cuba (Bancec), a counterclaim arising from the expropriation of its
property, even though Bancec did not actively participate in the
expropriation of Citibank's property. The question becomes
whether Bancec may be regarded as a mere arm, an alter ego, of
the Cuban government. If this relationship is established, then
existing law6 would compel a finding that Citibank's counterclaim
is properly asserted against Bancee. The district and circuit courts
reached differing results in this determination.
7
This Note presents the factual setting in which the instant
claim arose, and discusses the rulings of the lower courts and the
conflicting rationales in light of existing law. In conclusion, it
proposes a balancing test incorporating the relevant criteria for
consideration in this and like cases.
I. ORIGIN OF THE PRESENT CLAIMS
Shortly after the establishment of the new national govern-
ment, the Republic of Cuba created Bancec pursuant to Law No.
793 of April 25, 1960,8 which described it as "[a]n official autono-
mous credit institution for foreign trade .. .with full juridical
capacity." 9 Under the terms of Law No. 793, Bancec's governing
board was comprised of representatives from the various Cuban
government ministries,10 its capital was contributed by the Cuban
complaint), complaint dismissed, 272 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), afj'd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
4. 505 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 253 (1982).
5. See infra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
6. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973).
7. See Bancec, 505 F. Supp. 412; 658 F.2d 913.
8. Act of Apr. 25, 1960, No. 793, 58 G.O. at 10,921-26, Joint App. at 36-56, Bancec.
9. Art. 1, 58 G.O. at 10,921, Joint App. at 37, Bancec.
10. Art. 1, bylaw XI, 58 G.O. at 10,923, Joint App. at 46, Bancec.
The Governing Board ... shall be presided . . .by the President of the "Banco
Nacional de Cuba" and shall be composed of a Delegate of the Minister of Com-
merce, a Delegate of the Minister of Economy, a Delegate of the National Agrarian
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government, which also subscribed to all of its stock," and all net
profits from operations accrued to the state. 12 The Second Circuit
found that Bancec's purposes included "the encouragement of pro-
duction of goods for export, the increase of exports without affect-
ing essential national sources of supply, and the stimulation and
diversification of foreign markets for Cuban products."' 3
On August 12, 1960, Bancec entered into two contracts 14
whereby it agreed to purchase sugar from the National Institute of
Agrarian Reform (INRA), the state sugar monopoly, and sell it to
the Cuban Canadian Sugar Company.15 The consideration for the
contract between Bancec and Cuban Canadian was an irrevocable
letter of credit in favor of Bancec issued by Citibank on August 18,
1960.16 Bancec assigned this letter of credit to Banco Nacional de
Cuba (Banco Nacional)17 for collection. In due course, Citibank
was presented with the letter of credit, and on September 21, 1960
was called upon to pay U.S.$193,280 to Banco Nacional as Bancec's
collecting agent. 18
On September 16, 1960, however, the revolutionary govern-
ment of Cuba had nationalized Citibank's eleven Cuban
Reform Institute (INRA) and a Delegate of the Department of Mines and Petroleum
of the Ministry of Agriculture.
id.
11. Art. 1, bylaw IV, 58 G.O. at 10,922, Joint App. at 38, Bancec.
12. Art. 1, bylaw V, 58 G.O. at 10,922, Joint App. at 39, Bancec. "The profits ... shall
be considered as fiscal revenue and shall be deposited in the General Treasury of the
Republic .... " Id.
13. Bancec, 658 F.2d at 915. See also Act of Apr. 25, 1960, No. 793, art. 1, bylaw VIII,
58 G.O. at 10,922, Joint App. at 39-41, Bancec (enumerating the purposes and powers of
Bancec). "[Bancec] is an organization designed to contribute to, and collaborate with.., the
Government and . . . 'Banco Nacional de Cuba.' " Id.
14. Contract No. 555, Joint App. at 65, Bancec; Contract No. 556, Joint App. at 62,
Bancec. The price differential between the two contracts is the profit which Bancee was to
realize from the transaction. See Contract No. 555 para. 2, Joint App. at 65, Bancec;
Contract No. 556 para. 2, Joint App. at 62, Bancec.
15. Bancec, 658 F.2d at 915.
16. Id.
17. Banco Nacional is the central bank of Cuba, and engages in activities similar to the
central banks of most countries.
Banco Nacional, since its formation in 1948, had functioned as the central Bank of
Cuba. It engaged in domestic and international banking and was the sole depository
of state funds. In addition it had extensive powers both to control and protect the
Cuban currency in international trade and to regulate all commercial banks operat-
ing in Cuba.
Id. at 916.
18. Id. at 915.
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branches. 19 Upon presentment of the letter of credit, Citibank cred-
ited Banco Nacional's account for the stated amount, but rather
than remitting it to Banco Nacional, Citibank charged this sum
against the value of the assets which it had lost in the expropria-
tion.2 0 Bancec then instituted this action against Citibank to recover
the amount so charged, 2' and Citibank counterclaimed, arguing
that since its lost assets exceeded Bancec's claim, dismissal of the
complaint was required.2 2
II. CONFLICTING RATIONALES OF THE LOWER COURTS
The District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that Bancec was an alter ego of the Cuban government2 3 and
allowed Citibank a full set-off, which resulted in dismissal of the
complaint. 24 This determination was made despite language in
19. Id. at 916. The expropriations were executed pursuant to the Act of July 6, 1960,
No. 851, 58 G.O. at 16,367, Joint App. at 57, Bancec, and Resolution of Sept. 17, 1960, No.
2, 58 G.O.E. at 1, Joint App. at 70, Bancec. Id. See also Chase, 658 F.2d at 878. Law No.
851 provided, in part, the grant of
[f]ull authority.., upon the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic...
[to] proceed to nationalize, through forced expropriation, the properties or enter-
prises owned by physical and corporate persons who are nationals of the United
States of North America, or of the enterprises in which such physical and corporate
persons have an interest, even though they be organized under the Cuban laws.
Art. 1, 58 G.O. at 16,367, Joint App. at 58, Bancec. Although this was the general grant of
authority for the Cuban expropriations, Resolution No. 2 specifically conferred the authority
for the nationalization of Citibank's Cuban branches. Resolution of Sept. 17, 1960, No. 2, 58
C.O.E. at 2, Joint App. at 73, Bancec. See also Chase, 658 F.2d at 878 & n.3. The Resolution
also designated Banco Nacional as the official agency to take over Citibank's assets. Resolu-
tion No. 2, 58 G.O.E. at 2, Joint App. at 73, Bancec. See also Bancec, 658 F.2d at 916;
Chase, 658 F.2d at 879.
20. Bancec, 658 F.2d at 915.
21. Id. Shortly after the present claim was filed, the Cuban government dissolved
Bancec pursuant to Act of Feb. 23, 1961, No. 930, 59 G.O.E. 1, Joint App. 82, Bancec, and
Act of Feb. 23, 1961, No. 934, 59 G.O.E. 12. Pursuant to Law No. 930, Bancec's assets,
rights, and claims "peculiar to the banking business" devolved to Banco Nacional. 59 G.O.E.
1, Joint App. 82, Bancec. Law No. 934 provided for the devolution of Bancec's assets and
claims not peculiar to the banking business to a newly created Ministry of Foreign Trade. 59
G.O.E. 12. Also pursuant to Law No. 934, Empresa Cubana de Exportaciones was estab-
lished to engage in commercial activities previously performed by Bancec. Id. This organiza-
tion, too, was dissolved by the government, and succeeded by Empresa Cubana Exportadora
de Azucar y sus Derivados (Cubazucar), which remains in existence today. Bancec, 658 F.2d
at 916 n.4.
22. Bancec, 658 F.2d at 916.
23. 505 F. Supp. at 428.
24. Id. at 467.
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Law No. 793 which stated that Bancec was a separate juridical
entity.2 5 The district court deemed this description self-serving, and
declined to be bound by it.26 The dispositive factors for this deter-
mination included: (1) Bancec's lack of an independent existence;
(2) its exclusive control by the government; (3) its total dependence
on the government for financing; and (4) accrual of its net profits
to the government.2 7
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and held
that Bancec could not be equated with the Cuban government for
purposes of this litigation. Consequently, because no alter ego rela-
tionship existed, Citibank's counterclaim was not properly assert-
able against Bancec. 28 The court stated that the factors which
25. Art. 1, 58 G.O. at 10,921, Joint App. at 37, Bancec. Bancec's enabling statute
describes it as "[a]n official autonomous credit institution for foreign trade ...with full
juridical capacity." Id.
26. Bancec, 505 F. Supp. at 428.
The law creating Bancec describes it as "an official, autonomous, credit institution
for foreign trade with full juridical capacity and capital of its own." This view of
Bancec is not controlling on the Court. Under all of the relevant circumstances
shown in this record, including the Stipulated Facts, it is clear that Bancec lacked an
independent existence, and was a mere arm of the Cuban Government, performing
a purely governmental function. The control of Bancec was exclusively in the hands
of the government, and Bancec was established solely to further Governmental
purposes. Moreover, Bancec was totally dependent on the Government for financ-
ing and required to remit all of its profits to the Government.
Id. at 427 (emphasis added). The court continued, "[d]oing justice in this case should not be
obfuscated or side-tracked by self-serving recitals in post-revolutionary statutes of the Cuban
Government, undoubtedly drawn with litigation of this sort in mind." Id. at 428.
27. Id. at 427. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text, describing Bancec's struc-
ture and purposes pursuant to its enabling statute, Law No. 793. The district court ruled that
it perceived no difference between Bancec and Banco Nacional for purposes of establishing an
alter ego relation between them and the Cuban government. 505 F. Supp. at 427. In noting
that Banco Nacional was an alter ego of the government, the court deemed as controlling the
Second Circuit's prior pronouncement in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank,
478 F.2d 191, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1973). 505 F. Supp. at 429-30. Consequently, since Bancec is to
be regarded the same as Banco Nacional, and since Banco Nacional has been held to be
Cuba's alter ego, the district court concluded that Bancee too was Cuba's alter ego. Id. at
423.
28. Bancec, 658 F.2d at 917. On appeal from the district court's ruling, the plaintiff-
appellant Bancec advanced three arguments for the lower court's reversal: (1) that Bancec
was not an alter ego of Cuba, rather a separate juridical entity; (2) that even if Bancec were a
mere arm of the Cuban government, the act of state doctrine precluded adjudication of the
counterclaim; and (3) that the losses which Citibank complained of had been compensated by
offsets in prior litigation. Id. at 917. See also Brief for Appellant at 1, Bancec. The circuit
court based its reversal on the ground that Bancec was not an alter ego of the Cuban
government. 658 F.2d at 917, 920. It made no rulings as to the merits of the latter two points
advanced by the appellant. Notwithstanding the court's silence on these issues, it appears
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prompted it to hold in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National
upon an analysis of the existing law that the act of state doctrine would not bar the present
counterclaim. Although the origin of the act of state doctrine may be traced to The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812), Chief Justice Fuller's articula-
tion of the doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897), is regarded as the
" 'classic American statement' of the doctrine." See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762-63 (1972) (Banco I) (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416). Chief
Justice Fuller stated:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by
reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.
168 U.S. at 252. In Banco I, Citibank had loaned a predecessor of the respondent a sum of
money which was secured by a pledge of United States government bonds. 406 U.S. at 760.
Upon Cuba's nationalization of Citibank's branches, Citibank sold the collateral and applied
the proceeds to repay the principal and accrued interest. Id. Due to the then existing market
conditions, Citibank realized some U.S.$1.8 million in excess of the principal and interest,
and Banco Nacional sued to recover this excess. Id. at 761. Citibank counterclaimed, arguing
that it had a right to offset repayment of this excess with the value of its property which was
expropriated. Id. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the act of state doctrine
effectively barred Citibank's counterclaim. Id. at 762. The Court, in a plurality decision,
held that the counterclaim was not barred. Id. In reaching this decision, Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices Rehnquist and White deemed relevant the State Department's view as to
the applicability of the doctrine, thus advancing the so-called Bernstein exception to the act
of state doctrine as developed in Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (allowing courts to consider the views of the
Executive Branch in determining whether the act of state doctrine bars an action). 406 U.S.
at 768. The remaining six Justices, however, expressly rejected the Bernstein exception,
arguing that it violated the separation of powers clause.
Of these six Justices, two believed that despite the inapplicability of the Bernstein
exception, the counterclaim was not barred by the act of state doctrine. Justice Douglas
believed that National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), was controlling.
406 U.S. at 770. There, on similar facts, an offsetting counterclaim was allowed up to, but
not exceeding, the plaintiff Republic of China's claim. 348 U.S. at 363-66. Justice Powell was
of the view that the judiciary should consider whether, in the particular case before it,
adjudication by the courts would violate the act of state doctrine. Thus, he rejected both
Republic oJ China and Bernstein as controlling, but found that in this case, the counterclaim
was justiciable. 406 U.S. at 773-76. On remand, the circuit court held that Banco Nacional
was an alter ego of the Cuban government because of its active participation in the expropria-
tion. 478 F.2d at 193-94.
Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), also considered whether
certain actions were sufficient to qualify as acts of state. In Dunhill, interventors were
appointed by the Cuban government to manage the expropriated tobacco businesses. These
interventors refused to refund certain payments mistakenly made by Dunhill. When Dunhill
sued, the interventors claimed their refusal to pay was an act of state, thus precluding an
affirmative judgment against them. Id. at 687. The Supreme Court, in refusing to apply the
act of state doctrine, id. at 691, held that the interventors' refusal to pay was not, in and of
itself, an act of state. Id. at 691-92. Four Justices supported the view that the act of state
doctrine should not apply in cases which repudiate purely commercial obligations owed by a
foreign sovereign or by one of its commercial instrumentalities. Id. at 695. The district court
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in Bancec recognized that the Dunhill rule does not operate to bar Citibank's counterclaim as
far as the act of state defense is concerned. 505 F. Supp. at 430. "[T]hat a counterclaim by
way of set-off, limited to the amount of a foreign state's principal claim as plaintiff, is not
barred by the Act of State doctrine or by sovereign immunity, has been reaffirmed by the
majority, concurring and dissenting opinions in [Dunhill] .... " Id.
The Second Circuit recently restated the Supreme Court's rule in Banco I in its decision
in Chase, 658 F.2d at 884.
[W]here (1) the Executive Branch has provided a Bernstein letter advising the courts
that it believes act of state doctrine need not be applied, (2) there is no showing that
an adjudication of the claim will interfere with delicate foreign relations, and (3)
the claim against the foreign sovereign is asserted by way of counterclaim and does
not exceed the value of the sovereign's claim, adjudication of the counterclaim for
expropriation of the defendant's property is not barred by the act of state doctrine.
Id. Consequently, Republic of China, Banco I, and Dunhill, along with the Chase restate-
ment of the Banco I rule, support the conclusion that the act of state doctrine does not bar
Citibank's counterclaim against Bancec. Similarly, sovereign immunity does not preclude
Citibank's present counterclaim.
Sovereign immunity may be waived, Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 24 (1933), and a
general appearance in litigation in a federal court constitutes such a waiver. Clark v.
Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883). See also Petty v. Tennessee-Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359
U.S. 275, 276 (1959) (citing with approval Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933) and Clark, 108 U.S. 436
(1883)). Because Bancee instituted the present suit, the Clark rule applies to bar sovereign
immunity as a defense. Accord 45 AM. JuR. 2D Int'l Law § 59 (1969); 48 C.J.S. Int'l Law § 58
(1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 70
(1965). See also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976) (FSIA).
Section 1607 of the FSIA is a codification of the Republic of China rule, permitting a
counterclaim up to but not exceeding a plaintiff sovereign's claim. See also Field, The
Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 515, 545-46 (1978) (noting that sovereign immunity is criticized by most commentators,
and citing Republic of China); Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Govern-
ment Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80,
120 n.207 (1977) (observing that "[t]he Supreme Court has recently suggested that the act of
state doctrine may not apply to commercial acts of foreign states"); Kane, Suing Foreign
Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1982) (containing a thorough
discussion of the FSIA); Lowenfeld, Act of State and Department of State: First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 795 (1972); Lowenfeld, In Search of the
Intangible: A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 102, 111-15 (1978)
(discussing the Dunhill result); McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad: An
Antitrust Approach, 86 YALE L. J. 215, 234-35 nn. 108 & 114 (1976) (discussing the commer-
cial acts exception to sovereign immunity, and noting the difficulty the Supreme Court has
had in applying the act of state doctrine in recent years); Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and
Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1, 20
n.132 (1976) (containing an exhaustive treatment of the act of state doctrine and sovereign
immunity, and observing that "[a]lthough Republic of China was decided on sovereign
immunity grounds, the Supreme Court has cited it as precedent in two act of state cases");
Note, Legal Impediments to Normalization of Trade with Cuba, 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1007, 1027-35 (1976) (applying sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine to the
Cuban expropriations).
There is also authority to the effect that Bancee's argument denying the present counter-
claim because of offsets in prior litigation is without merit. Application of the collateral
source rule should permit Citibank's present offset. See Agwilines, Inc. v. Eagle Oil &
Shipping Co., 153 F.2d 869 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 835 (1946). "[T]here is no more
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City Bank2 9 that Banco Nacional was the alter ego of the govern-
ment did not exist in Bancec.30 The key factor in Banco Nacional
was the role which Banco Nacional played in expropriating the
banks. 3 The circuit court in Bancec agreed with the district court's
findings but rejected its conclusion, reasoning that Bancec did not
actively participate in the expropriation.
32
Thus, two competing and equally valid rationales emerge from
the decisions of the courts below. The district court was concerned
with foreign governments avoiding liability for properties they had
expropriated. The court equated Bancec with the government,
33
thereby allowing a counterclaim for the value of the expropriated
property. However, the district court seemed to suggest that any
instrumentality of government which exhibited Bancec's character-
istics would be subject to liability for the expropriatory acts of its
government, regardless of its role in the expropriations.
solidly established principle than that payments or reparations of whatever nature which the
injured party receives from a collateral source are, in the words of the courts, res inter alios
acta, of no concern to the wrongdoer." Id. at 873 (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Judge Hand's opinion for the majority was in accord with the rule pronounced by the dissent.
"[W]hether the [injured party] ... received any benefit or not, . . . it does not lie in a
[wrongdoer's] mouth to say that some third person ...has indemnified his victim for his
loss. ... [This] doctrine we accept ..... Id. at 871. See also Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid
Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 465 P.2d 61, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970), in which the court held the
collateral source rule applicable to a governmental entity. "Defendants would have this court
create ... a novel exception to the collateral source rule for [wrongdoers] who are public
entities or public employees. We see no justification for such special treatment. . . .[That]
would constitute an unwarranted and arbitrary discrimination." Id. at 14, 465 P.2d at 69-70,
84 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82.
29. 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973).
30. Bancec, 658 F.2d at 918-19. In Banco Nacional, since the Cuban militia seized
Citibank's property on orders from officials of Banco Nacional, and since the expropriatory
orders were signed by Che Guevara, Minister of State, in his capacity as President of Banco
Nacional, the court concluded that these facts "clearly indicated Banco's active role as a mere
arm or division of the Cuban government." 478 F.2d at 194. In distinguishing these two
cases, the court avoided the many glaring similarities between Banco Nacional and Bancec.
Both were completely owned by the government, thus controlled by the government, their
profits inured to the government, and Che Guevara, Minister of State, who signed the
expropriation orders, was concurrently President of both Banco Nacional and Bancec. 658
F.2d at 918.
31. Bancec, 658 F.2d at 918-19 (quoting Banco Nacional, 478 F.2d at 194).
32. 658 F.2d at 918-19. "Citibank has not shown that Bancec played any role.., in the
expropriations of the Citibank branches. Since Bancec had no connection with the subject
matter of the Citibank counterclaims, we will not rule, for the purposes of the present
litigation, that Bancec was an alter ego of the Cuban government." Id. at 919.
33. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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In contrast, the circuit court was concerned with preserving
the separate identities of governments and their instrumentalities.
Although it recognized that in some cases it would be appropriate
to disregard their separate classifications, 34 the court ruled that
where an instrumentality does not play any role whatsoever in the
expropriatory acts of its government, then it is not proper to treat
that instrumentality as the government when adjudicating claims
involving the expropriations.
While the district court ruling may be too broad in applica-
tion, the rather mechanical test espoused by the circuit court 35
potentially precludes the adjudication of counterclaims arising
from nationalizations. For example, the confiscating government,
by ensuring that the instrumentality which brings the suit did not
have a key role in the expropriation, can deny the company whose
property has been expropriated the possibility of asserting a merito-
rious counterclaim. 36 The difficulty in this case lies in attempting to
incorporate the strengths while avoiding the deficiencies present in
both approaches.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Existing Law
1. The Instrumentality Relation
Although there is an absence of any case law which is directly
on point for adjudicating the present litigation, certain cases may
nonetheless be relied upon for guidance. 37 In Unemployment Com-
pensation Commission v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. ,38 the issue
34. See Bancec, 658 F.2d at 918.
35. Namely, whether the plaintiff is an instrumentality of the government, and if so,
whether it plays a key role in the expropriations. See id.
36. In Federal Rep. of Ger. v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 478
F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974), the court voiced a related policy
consideration. "To allow the Weimar [Museum] to intervene in this case would render our
Government's non-recognition of the GDR a meaningless gesture. Such a holding would
permit non-recognized governments to use our courts at will by creating 'juridical entities'
whenever the need arises." 358 F. Supp. at 757 (emphasis added). This is undeniably
applicable to Bancec as well.
37. Although these cases are concerned with intergovernmental tax immunity, the
factors used by the courts in finding the existence of an instrumentality relationship are
applicable to the Bancec litigation.
38. 215 N.C. 491, 2 S.E.2d 592 (1939).
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was whether the defendant, a bank organized under North Caro-
lina law, was a governmental instrumentality and thus protected
by intergovernmental tax immunity from the unemployment com-
pensation laws of North Carolina. 39 The court noted that it may not
be possible to prescribe a definition of governmental instrumental-
ity applicable to all cases, and that it would indeed be unwise to do
so. 40 But the court did articulate factors to consider in determining
the existence of an instrumentality relationship. "Generally speak-
ing, . . . it may be said that any commission, bureau, corporation or
other organization, public in nature, created and wholly owned by
the Government for the convenient prosecution of its governmental
functions, existing at the will of its creator, is an instrumentality of
government .... ,41
2. The Alter Ego Relation
Decisions of the Supreme Court have equated the United
States government with its instrumentalities. In Rainwater v.
United States,42 the Court held that a wholly owned government
instrumentality, the Commodity Credit Corporation, 43 was a part
of the United States government because it carried out the federal
farm programs with public funds. 44 Under this rule, the perform-
ance of a governmental function was the key in equating an instru-
mentality with its government. In Emergency Fleet Corp. v. West-
ern Union Telegraph Co. ,45 the issue presented was whether Fleet 46
could avail itself of the lower "governmental rate"charged by West-
ern Union for transmissions on its systems, 47 that is, whether Fleet
39. Id. at 494, 2 S.E.2d at 594.
40. Id. at 496, 2 S.E.2d at 595. The court suggested that "[e]ach case must be deter-
mined as it arises." Id.
41. Id. To the same effect are Carter v. Coosa Valley Youth Servs., 378 So.2d 1145,
1147 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979); Department of Cal., Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Kunz, 125
Cal. App. 2d 19, 26, 269 P.2d 882, 887 (1954).
42. 356 U.S. 590 (1958).
43. Id. at 591.
44. Id. at 592.
45. 275 U.S. 415 (1928).
46. All of Fleet's stock was subscribed for and paid by the government, thus it was
wholly owned by the government, and all profits not needed for operations inured to the
Treasury. Id. at 422, 424. Fleet's activities consisted of "maintaining and liquidating prop-
erty acquired for the United States during the World War, of settling claims arising there-
from, and of operating, or causing to be operated, vessels not disposed of." Id. at 421.
47. Id. at 416-17.
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could be equated with the government. The Court held that Fleet
was entitled to the government rate because it was wholly owned
by the government, 48 its profits accrued to the Treasury, 49 and it
was engaged in a government function. 50
In Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 5 the question
was whether there was a sufficient nexus between the Kunstsam-
mlungen zu Weimar (Weimar Museum) 52 and the German Demo-
cratic Republic such that an alter ego relation existed between
them.5 3 The issue before the District Court for the Eastern District
of New York was who had legal title to certain paintings stolen
during World War II from the Land of Thuringia, a province of
what is now the German Democratic Republic. 54 Elicofon claimed
title to the paintings, having been a good faith purchaser for
value. 55 The Federal Republic of Germany filed suit against Elico-
fon, arguing that it was the only recognized representative of the
German people.56 The Weimar Museum intervened, 57 alleging that
it was the rightful owner because the paintings were stolen while in
its possession .58
The district court held that the Museum was a mere arm of the
German Democratic Republic, and since that government was not
recognized by the United States, the Museum lacked standing to sue
in United States courts. 59 The factors used by the court in determin-
48. Id. at 422.
49. Id. at 424.
50. Id. at 424-25.
51. 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 931 (1974).
52. The Kunstsammlungen is an art museum located in the Land of Thuringia, a
province of what is now the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). See id. at 749.
53. Id. at 756.
54. Id. at 749.
55. Id.
56. The Federal Republic of Germany alleged that "[a]t the time of their theft, the ...
[p]aintings were the property of the Weimar Museum which, in turn, belonged to the State of
Thuringia, one of the Federal States of the German Reich, of which [the Federal Republic of
Germany] is the only lawful and recognized successor." Id. at 749 n.1 (quoting paragraph 9
of the plaintiff's complaint).
57. Id. at 749. The Grand Duchess of Saxony-Weimar was also an intervenor in the
litigation. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 756-57. However, on September 14, 1974, the United States government
extended formal recognition to the German Democratic Republic. Consequently, the Muse-
um's intervention was allowed, and the district court's order in 358 F. Supp. 747 was
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ing that the Museum was an arm of the government included the
performance of a governmental function, complete dominion and
control of the Museum by the German Democratic Republic, and
conformance to the policies of the Minister of Culture and Educa-
tion.60 The court further noted that the grant of a juristic person
status to the Museum did not alter the relationship between it and
the government. 6' The rule to be extracted from these cases is that
where an instrumentality is within the government's control, and is
performing a governmental function, it is appropriate to consider
that instrumentality as an alter ego of the government.
B. Application to Bancec
The Wachovia ruling is applicable to Bancec, since Bancec
was wholly owned by the government,62 engaged in a governmen-
tal function,6 3 and existed at the will of its creator.6 4 Under this test,
Bancec is an instrumentality of the Cuban government. This alone,
however, will not suffice to validate Citibank's present counter-
claim.6 Additionally, Bancec and the Cuban government must be
so inextricably intertwined that Bancec is deemed to be a mere tool
of that government.6
Bancec was empowered to carry on the foreign trade of Cuba,
stimulate production of goods for export, and render foreign mar-
vacated. See Federal Rep. of Ger. v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 813, 814-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). In
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), ajj'd, 678
F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982), the Museum was held entitled to the paintings, having passed the
standing barrier through formal recognition by the United States of the German Democratic
Republic. Throughout the lengthy history of this case, the factors used by the district court in
holding the Museum to be an alter ego of the German Democratic Republic were not
disturbed. Rather, by formal recognition of the German Democratic Republic, the standing
problem no longer remained. Therefore, those factors used by the district court, and ap-
proved by the Second Circuit, Elicofon, 478 F.2d at 232, which equated the Museum with
the government, remain valid authority.
60. 358 F. Supp. at 756.
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. See also Wells & Hellerstein, The
Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980).
64. See supra note 21, which evidences the Cuban government's capricious formation
and dissolution of various successor instrumentalities for the carrying on of Bancec's business.
65. The court states, "[a]s a general matter, . . . an instrumentality of a government is
not necessarily an alter ego of that government . Bancec, 658 F.2d at 918.
66. See Banco Nacional, 478 F.2d 191, 191-94.
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kets ripe for Cuban products. 7 These are governmental programs 8
not unlike the federal farm programs in Rainwater. Furthermore,
as was the case in both Rainwater and Fleet,69 Bancec was also
wholly owned by the government, 70 financed with public funds,7 '
and required to remit its net profits to the General Treasury of
Cuba. 72 Additionally, as was the Museum in Elicojon, Bancec was
endowed with full juridical capacity.7 3 The district court properly
recognized this was self-serving in nature, 74 but the circuit court
deemed relevant the recital of Bancec's autonomous status.7 5
In Bancec, the Second Circuit disregarded its own determina-
tion in Elicofon,76 in which it had upheld the lower court's ruling.77
The district court in Elicofon did not consider itself bound by the
Museum's grant of a juristic entity status.78 Moreover, both the
67. See Act of Apr. 25, 1960, No. 793, art. 1, bylaw VIII, 58 C.O. at 10,922, Joint App.
at 39-41, Bancec.
68. "[Bancec] is an organization designed to contribute to, and collaborate with ... the
Government and . . . 'Banco Nacional de Cuba.' " Id. (emphasis added). See also Wells &
Hellerstein, supra note 63.
69. Fleet also supports the contention that an instrumentality may be engaged in a
commercial activity and still be an arm of the government. See 275 U.S. at 424-25. Bancee's
involvement in governmental functions and simultaneous engagement in commercial activi-
ties bolstered its status as an alter ego of Cuba. There is, however, language in Fleet which at
first seems to be inconsistent with finding an alter ego relation between Bancec and Cuba.
See id. at 425-26. Nevertheless, it can be reconciled with Bancec inasmuch as that language
only concerns corporations which are not wholly owned by the government. Id. Since Bancec
is a wholly owned instrumentality, see Act of Apr. 25, 1960, No. 793, art. 1, bylaw IV, 58
C.O. at 10,922, Joint App. at 38, Bancec, it falls within the ambit of Fleet and Rainwater for
finding the existence of the alter ego relation.
70. See Act of Apr. 25, 1960, No. 793, art. 1, bylaw IV, 58 G.O. at 10,922, Joint App.
at 38, Bancec.
71. Act of Apr. 25, 1960, No. 793, art. 1, 58 G.O. at 10,922, Joint App. at 39, Bancec.
72. Id., Joint App. at 38, Bancec.
73. Id. at 10,921, Joint App. at 37, Bancec.
74. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
75. "[W]e decline to hold that a trading corporation wholly owned by a foreign govern-
ment, but created and operating as a separate juridical entity, is an alter ego of that
government .... " 658 F.2d at 920. But cf. supra note 34 and accompanying text.
76. 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973).
77. Id. at 232.
78. See 358 F. Supp. at 756. Rather, the court looked at the substance over the form.
Accord Cherry Cotton Mills, Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 536, 539 (1946) ("[tlhat the
Congress chose to call it a corporation does not alter its characteristics so as to make it
something other than what it actually is, an agency selected by Government to accomplish
purely governmental purposes"); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic & Com-
merce Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490, 501 (1918) ("the courts will not permit themselves to be blinded or
deceived by mere forms [of] law but, regardless of fictions, will deal with the substance of the
transaction involved as if the corporate agency did not exist and as the justice of the case may
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Museum and Bancec were under the complete control of their
respective governments, 79 and Bancec's existence was at the will of
require"); Turner v. TVA, 613 F.2d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing Cherry, 327 U.S. 536
(1946)); Butz Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 619, 622 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (citing Cherry,
327 U.S. 536 (1946)); Carter v. Coosa Valley Youth Servs., 378 So.2d 1145, 1147 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1979) ("[w]e find the trial court correct in looking through the form ... to [the] ...
substance ....").
Indeed, this line of reasoning suggests the application, by analogy, of a related principle
from corporate law-that of "piercing the corporate veil," wherein (1) the actions of a
subsidiary are sought to be attributed to the parent or the reverse, or (2) the shareholders are
sought to be held liable for the actions or obligations of the corporation. See generally 1 W.
FLETCHER, CYc. CORP. §§ 41-41.1 (perm. ed. 1974); H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 146 (2d ed.
1970); N. LA-rrIN, CORPORATIONS §§ 14-15 (1971); E. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED
CORPORATIONS (1936); I. WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED COR-
PORATION PROBLEMS (1929); Horowitz, Disregarding the Entity of Private Corporations, 14
WASH. L. REV. 285 (1939); Latty, The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34
MICH. L. REV. 597 (1936). In addition to the cited cases, supra, NLRB v. Deena Artware,
Inc., 361 U.S. 398 (1960), provides an eloquent articulation of the concept.
"Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules
of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an agent. Where control
is less than this, we are remitted to the tests of honesty and justice." That is not a
complete catalogue. The several companies may be represented as one. Apart from
that is the question whether in fact the economic enterprise is one, the corporate
forms being largely paper arrangements that do not reflect the business realities.
One company may in fact be operated as a division of another; one may be only a
shell, inadequately financed; the affairs of the group may be so intermingled that no
distinct corporate lines are maintained.
Id. at 403 (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926))
(footnotes omitted). Applying this to Bancec, it appears that the terms of the Act of Apr. 25,
1960, No. 793, 58 G.O. 10,921, Joint App. at 36, Bancec, which attempt to create Bancec as
a separate juridical entity are largely paper arrangements that do not reflect the business
realities. Indeed, that statute clearly evinces that Bancec was to be regarded as a mere
conduit for the policies of the government and Banco Nacional. "[Bancec] is an organization
designed to contribute to, and collaborate with, the international trade policy of the Govern-
ment and the application of the measures concerning foreign trade adopted by the 'Banco
Nacional de Cuba.' " Art. 1, bylaw VIII, 58 C.O. at 10,922, Joint App. at 39, Bancec
(emphasis added). This result is further warranted by United States v. Milwaukee Refrigera-
tor Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905), wherein the court observed "that a
corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason
to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is used to ... justify wrong...
the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons." This may be applied,
admittedly by analogy, to Bancec, since the Second Circuit has held that the Cuban expropri-
ation was an illegal activity, in violation of international law. See Banco Nacional, 478 F.2d
at 194. "[P]ractically all authorities agree that ... the corporation may be disregarded as an
intermediate between the ultimate person or persons or corporation and the adverse party;
and should be disregarded in the interest of justice in such cases as ... contravention of
law . 1..." I W  FLETCHER, CYc. CORP. § 41 (perm. ed. 1974).
79. See Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. at 756; Act of Apr. 25, 1960, No. 793, art. 1, bylaws IV, V,
58 G.O. at 10,922, Joint App. at 38-39, Bancec. Cuban Law No. 793 vested the government
with control of Bancec. The government owned all of its stock, contributed all of its capital,
and enjoyed the benefits of its net profits. Id.
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the Cuban government,80 as the Museum's existence depended on
the caprice of the German Democratic Republic. 81 The rule of
establishing an alter ego relation as developed in Elicofon is author-
ity for holding Bancec to be a mere arm, an alter ego, of Cuba.82
Bancec's position, however, is not entirely without support. In
connection with "piercing the corporate veil," 83 the courts are re-
luctant to casually disregard the separate identities of the parties,8 4
and face difficulties in applying the doctrine. 85
C. Inadequacy of Existing Standards
The criteria which the courts have used in determining the
existence of an alter ego relation do not encompass all the relevant
factors. Quite simply, existing law does not provide a sufficient
basis for resolving the Bancec litigation. In both Bancec and Elico-
Jon, the determination essentially revolved around one basic ques-
tion-did the government have control over its instrumentality. 86
Although this is an extremely relevant consideration, it should not
be the end of the inquiry as to the existence of the alter ego rela-
tion. 87
In addition to the control element, the performance of a gov-
ernmental function was deemed worthy of consideration in both
Rainwater and Fleet. But even this additional factor does not pro-
vide a complete catalogue.
80. See supra note 21.
81. See 358 F. Supp. at 756.
82. Existence of the alter ego relation in this case is further supported by a court order,
obtained at the request of Bancec's counsel, to substitute the Cuban government for Bancec as
the proper plaintiff. See Bancec, 505 F. Supp. at 424-25. This substitution, however, was not
made. Id. at 425.
83. See supra note 78.
84. See, e.g., Kirno Hill Corp. v. Holt, 618 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1980); Gartner v. Snyder,
607 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1979).
85. See, e.g., Douglas & Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corpora-
tions, 39 YALE L. J. 193 (1929).
86. These factors included: control by the government, continued existence dependent on
the government, dependence on the government for financing and personnel, and accrual of
the profits to the government. See Bancec, 505 F. Supp. at 427; Elicojon, 358 F. Supp. at
755-56. It cannot be questioned that all of these considerations essentially focus on who has
control of the instrumentality. Although both decisions also deemed relevant whether a
governmental function was being performed, 505 F. Supp. at 427; 358 F. Supp. at 756,
discussion of the preceding factors overshadowed this consideration.
87. For a discussion of the other factors which should have been weighed, see infra notes
89-109 and accompanying text.
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The deficiency of the existing standards is illustrated by the
fact that most instrumentalities will exhibit the fatal characteristics.
Applying these standards, the instrumentality in question is likely to
be liable for the actions or obligations of its government or related
entities. This would undoubtedly disrupt commerce with foreign
state trading companies.88
Finally, it should be noted that all of the preceding cases are
distinguishable from Bancec. Rainwater and Fleet were concerned
with domestic instrumentalities, and therefore did not present any
international ramifications. Elicofon, on the other hand, involved a
foreign instrumentality, but that case analyzed the alter ego rela-
tion in connection with a standing problem. In contrast, Bancec
seeks to establish the alter ego relationship in connection with a
counterclaim which does not present a standing issue. Thus, the
precise legal question presented by Bancec has not been previously
adjudicated. The Supreme Court's decision in Bancec, therefore,
will have the added distinction of creating law with respect to the
issue presented.
IV. THE BALANCING TEST: A PROPOSAL
In lieu of the standards adopted by the lower courts for resolv-
ing the present issue, 89 a balancing test is the appropriate alterna-
tive. 0 The circuit court's decision does not encompass all the rele-
vant criteria. That ruling was concerned primarily with whether
Bancec had played a key role in the expropriation of Citibank's
branches. 1 The district court came closer to utilizing a balancing
test, but it too did not incorporate all the relevant criteria.92
One factor to consider under this proposed balancing scheme
should be whether the instrumentality in issue is performing a
governmental function, or one that is commercial or proprietary in
88. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Rep. of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 315-16 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1012 (1982).
89. See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
90. It is beyond dispute that where two competing and equally valid claims are presented
for review, a balancing test is particularly appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971).
91. 658 F.2d at 918-19.
92. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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nature.9 3 However viewed, it cannot be denied that Bancec's func-
tion was governmental. The law which created Bancec specifically
provided that it was to collaborate with the government and Banco
Nacional in effectuating Cuba's trade policies.9 4 Furthermore, the
circuit court's ruling that Bancec was engaged in commercial activi-
ties9 5 is misleading. Any instrumentality engaged in promoting its
government's foreign trade will necessarily be involved in commer-
cial activities, but this does not change the governmental nature of
its functions. The commercial and governmental functions of an
instrumentality can coexist.9 6
Secondly, the element of dominion and control is to be ac-
corded substantial weight in determining whether there are two
separate and distinct entities. The district court properly considered
this element of control 7 at some length in arriving at its conclusion
that Bancec was to be equated with the government. 8 The facts to
consider in determining whether the requisite control exists include
the following: (1) does the instrumentality's existence depend on the
will of the government; (2) is it dependent on the government for
personnel and financing; (3) does it conform to the government's
policies; and (4) is its governing board composed of members of the
government. The district court found that Cuba did in fact have
control over Bancec, 9 and the circuit court agreed with this find-
ing. 100 Indeed, it is difficult to envision a contrary finding in view of
the legal framework creating Bancec and the Second Circuit's anal-
ysis of its function within the Cuban governmental structure. 0'
The length of time the instrumentality has been in existence is
also relevant to the weighing process. Although not conclusive, an
instrumentality's past performance would be evidence of its auton-
93. See generally Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 63. See also Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976) (discussing the commercial acts exception to sovereign
immunity).
94. See Act of Apr. 25, 1960, No. 793, art. 1, bylaws VIII, IX, 58 G.O. at 10,922-23, Joint
App. at 39-41, Bancec.
95. Bancec, 658 F.2d at 919.
96. See Fleet, 275 U.S. at 424-25. See also supra note 69.
97. See Bancec, 505 F. Supp. at 427.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Bancec, 658 F.2d at 917.
101. See supra notes 9-13, 27 and accompanying text.
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omy. Bancec's transient existence'0 2 makes it difficult to conclude
that in such a short period of time, Bancec developed its own
identity which was distinct from the government.
The question of whether there is a connection between Ban-
cec's claim and Citibank's counterclaim also merits close scrutiny.
If the conflicting claims did in fact arise from similar or 'related
events, then Citibank's counterclaim should be assertable against
Bancec. It is at this juncture that the circuit court did not assess the
complete facts. The court's ruling'0 3 failed to perceive that all of the
expropriations in Cuba were part of a "master plan" of the new
Cuban government.10 4 Pursuing this, a relationship develops be-
tween Citibank's counterclaim, which arose from the expropriation
of its Cuban branches, and Bancec's claim, the letter of credit,
which had as its underlying obligation expropriated sugar,' 05 since
both expropriations were part of the master plan. 0
Finally, policy considerations'0 7 should be weighed in the bal-
ancing process. 10 8 One such consideration would be the ramifica-
102. Bancec was created pursuant to the Act of Apr. 25, 1960, No. 793, 58 G.O. 10,921,
Joint App. 36, Bancec, and dissolved pursuant to the Act of Feb. 23, 1961, No. 930, 59
G.O.E. 1, Joint App. 82, Bancec, and Act of Feb. 23, 1961, No. 934, 59 G.O.E. 12. See
Bancec, 658 F.2d at 916 & n.4. See also supra note 21.
103. The court answered this question in the negative, stating that the expropriation of
Citibank's property was not related to Bancec's claim. 658 F.2d at 919.
104. See, e.g., Rogers, Of Missionaries, Fanatics, and Lawyers: Some Thoughts on Invest-
ment Disputes in the Americas, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1978). "In 1959 and 1960, the Cuban
Government expropriated the sugar plantations, nickel mining facilities, utilities and rail-
roads, investment companies, insurance firms, and private homes of North Americans." Id.
at 11 (footnote omitted). See also Chase, 658 F. 2d at 878 (describing the general goals of the
new government); Sutton, American Claims Against Cuba, 3 INT'L LAW. 741, 746-49 (1969)
(describing the laws which effected these expropriations).
105. See Bancec, 505 F. Supp. at 419, 423-24.
106. Although establishing a nexus between the two claims is the key in utilizing this
factor, the necessary connection should be a matter of proximity and degree.
107. See W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964). A policy oriented judge is
one "who is aware of the impact which judicial decisions can have on public policy, realizes
the leeway for discretion which his office permits, and is willing to take advantage of this
power and leeway to further particular policy aims." Id. at 4.
108. An appellate court can change the law based on policy considerations. See, e.g.,
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). In Loretto, Justice Blackmun noted: "The 19th century
precedents relied on by the Court lack any vitality outside the agrarian context in which they
were decided. But if... they have any lingering vitality, then, in my view, those cases stand
for a constitutional rule that is uniquely unsuited to the modern urban age." Id. at 3182
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice Blackmun also articulated a rather
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tions which the circuit court's decision would encourage if it were
permitted to stand. In selecting which entity will institute suit in
the United States, a foreign government will be inclined to choose
an instrumentality which did not have an active role in the expro-
priatory acts. This manipulation will ensure the government that
the instrumentality will not be held accountable for a counterclaim
based on the expropriations. 10  Policy considerations favoring ac-
countability of foreign governments therefore militate against the
circuit court's test, which makes it far too easy for such govern-
ments to avoid responsibility for expropriations.
In summary, the factors to be considered in utilizing the pro-
posed balancing test include: (1) whether a governmental function
is being performed by the instrumentality; (2) whether it is within
the government's control; (3) the length of time it has been in
existence; (4) whether there is a connection between the conflicting
claims; and (5) the applicable policy considerations.
CONCLUSION
This Note has suggested a more comprehensive approach for
the adjudication of expropriation cases involving instrumentalities
of foreign governments. Although use of the prescribed balancing
test will not provide all of the answers all of the time, it should
make the decisions in these cases more coherent, rational, and
understandable.'10 In Bancec, the instrumentality was engaged in a
governmental function, was controlled by the government, was in
convincing policy argument: "[T]his Court long ago recognized that new social circumstances
can justify legislative modification of a property owner's common-law rights, without com-
pensation, if the legislative action serves sufficiently important public interests," id. at 3186,
and concluded by saying that, "today's decision ... represents an archaic judicial response to
a modern social problem." Id.
109. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Douglas & Shanks, supra note 85, discussing piercing the corporate veil.
[T]here is no one formula which can be successfully applied to the ...cases. The
formula varies with the facts of each case. But that is unimportant. The significance
of this examination is that the concepts which the courts are using can be broken
down and translated into the varying factual combinations which are found. That
translation will not give the answer to the problem at issue. But it will serve to pose
the problem in language which seems more understandable. It will result in reduc-
ing the cases to a lower common denominator. It will make more intelligible, and
perhaps more intelligent, the answer to the question, was the subsidiary an "agent"
of the parent?
Id. at 210. This applies with equal vigor to the present situation.
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existence for a short duration and then summarily dissolved, and
the conflicting claims were related.' Applying the proposed
test,1 2 the necessary factors for review become crystallized, and
support a finding that Bancec was an alter ego of the Cuban
government. Therefore, reversal of the circuit court is compelled.
Aris Haigian
111. See supra notes 89-109 and accompanying text.
112. See id.
